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ARTICLE

Why Congress Drafts Gibberish
Richard K. Neumann Jr.*
We are so used to Congressional gibberish that we take it for granted.
We sigh, roll our eyes, and ask, “Will Congress’s drafters ever learn?”
If we mean the drafters Congress has on staff, maybe that’s an unfair
question. Every writing teacher knows that it’s impossible to separate
developing the wording from developing the ideas. Congress is one
drafter. Many people are involved—Senators, Representatives, employees
in their offices, committee staff, and the Senate and House Offices of
Legislative Counsel. But Congress is one author writing in one voice.
This article examines some typical Congressional gibberish and
hypothesizes some of its causes. Part I explains how the Supreme Court
was flummoxed by a statute so complicated that neither the justices nor
the lawyers arguing the case could really understand it. Part II examines a
statute so mysteriously drafted that no one really knows what a President
could legally do in replacing an Attorney General and Deputy Attorney
General who stood in the way when the President wanted to get rid of a
special counsel.
Part III shows how Congress hasn’t learned how to draft a coherent
criminal statute. Part IV examines the federal obstruction of justice
statutes, which are so incoherent that reading them is like wading through
glue.1 They appear here in Appendix A. I have redrafted those statutes,
cutting their size in half. The redraft is in the article’s Appendix B. The
Appendix’s footnotes explain how gibberish became clarity.
Part V hypothesizes some of the causes of Congressional gibberish.
The main hypothesis is that legislating is made up of two functions—

* Professor of Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law, Hofstra University. Because it is superbly peer-reviewed and peeredited, Legal Communication & Rhetoric: JALWD is special, and publishing in it is a professional pleasure. Virtually every
editorial suggestion improved this article. Warmest thanks to editors Kristin Gerdy, Amy Langenfeld, Susan Bay, Jessica
Wherry, and EIC Ruth Anne Robbins and, at Hofstra, Isaac Samuels and Navi Naat.
1 Alfred Lord Tennyson used those words in describing Ben Jonson’s poetry. FIGHTING WORDS: WRITERS LAMBAST OTHER
WRITERS—FROM ARISTOTLE TO ANNE RICE 5 (James Charlton ed., 1994).
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designing law and enacting it. Designing law is analogous to architecture
or engineering . It’s choosing an intellectual structure, with optimal
wording, so that a statute will get the right results. Enacting is adopting
the design so that it will be enforced. Legislators are good at the enacting
part but have few, if any, law-design skills. Judging by their output, almost
no one in Congress has the most important law-design skill—simplicity. If
there’s a way to make something unnecessarily complicated, an American
legislature will find it. That’s our one true legislative skill.

I. The Gibberish Case
The case was Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement
Fund.2 The statute was the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998,3 which amended the Securities Act of 1933.
The word gibberish doesn’t appear in the Court’s opinion. Judges are
too polite to put that in writing. But the word dominated oral argument:4
Justice Alito

Mr. Katyal, . . . [what are we] supposed to do when
Congress writes gibberish. And that’s what we have
here. You said it’s obtuse. That’s flattering. And we
have very smart lawyers here who have come up with
creative interpretations, but this is gibberish. It’s—it
is just gibberish. It says . . . that the state courts have
jurisdiction over federal claims, except as provided in
Section 77p, which says nothing whatsoever about
jurisdiction . . . for federal claims.

Mr. Katyal5

So—

Justice Alito

So what are—what are we supposed to do with this?

Mr. Katyal

Justice Alito, I—I think I’d say three things about that.
First, as I—as I was saying to Justice Ginsburg, I don’t
think the statute’s by any stretch a model of clarity,
but I don’t go so far as to say it is gibberish. . . .

Mr. Katyal
[later]

Congress had other ways of writing the statute that
are clear, that could have been clearer, but this Court
confronts this—and this returns to Justice Alito’s
question—all the time, in big cases like Burwell, in

2 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018).
3 3 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.
4 Oral Argument, Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018) (No. 15-1439), https//www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/15-1439_k5fl.pdf [hereinafter Cyan Transcript].
5 Neal K. Katyal for Cyan, Inc., Cyan Transcript, supra note 4, at 1.
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small cases like Perry versus Merit Systems Protection
Board last term, you’re dealing with the statute that,
maybe if you look at it one way it’s gibberish, maybe
some of you could have written it better, but it still
has to be given some meaning.
Justice Gorsuch
[later]

Mr. Goldstein, speaking of gibberish—

Mr. Goldstein6

Yes?

Justice Gorsuch

—aren’t we stuck with gibberish your way too? I
mean, it seems like it’s gibberish all the way down
here because—because under your version, as I
understand it, . . . that first “except” clause, is superfluous. It doesn’t—doesn’t do anything. And also we
render “involving a covered security,” that language,
potentially superfluous in (c).

Mr. Goldstein

Okay. So—

Justice Gorsuch

So help me out with that.

Mr. Goldstein

I—I—

Justice Gorsuch

And—and I know—I know we generally—you know,
we—nobody likes gibberish, but it is our job to try
and give effect whenever possible to Congress’s
language. It’s not for us to assume that Congress’s
language means nothing— 7

Justice Alito didn’t say “If Congress writes gibberish.” He said, “When
Congress writes gibberish.” He was referring to § 77v(a)’s cross-reference
to § 77p. Among other things, § 77v(a) gives state courts jurisdiction over
certain federal claims “except as provided in section 77p.” Section 77p
contains two judicial duties; seven declarations of jurisdiction and lack of
jurisdiction, many of them phrased as prohibitions even though they
aren’t; and five definitions, one of which contains a total of 41 concepts—
ideas that must be understood individually to understand the definition as
a whole.
A concept in this sense is a discrete idea being used as raw material by
a drafter. A three-element test has a minimum of three concepts, at least
one per element. If any of the elements is complicated, it will use more

6 Thomas C. Goldstein for the Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund. Id.
7 Id. at 11–12, 16, 47.
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than one concept, and the test’s total concept usage will rise. Every
concept imposes costs. Complying with a ten-issue test can be harder and
more complicated than complying with a three-issue test. The same is true
of enforcement. Complicated tests confuse everyone and lead to
complicated litigation.
Imagine that you’re a lawyer or a judge who must make a practical
decision that will be governed by this statute. In one section, Congress
told you to go to another section, but the thing Congress told you to find
isn’t where Congress told you to find it—even though Congress drafted
both sections. Congress sent you and others on a fool’s errand, imposing
costs on everyone affected. Lawyers didn’t know where to sue; judges
didn’t know what to do with the lawsuits; and eventually the Supreme
Court had to pretend to find meaning where there was none. Those were
real costs, passed on to ordinary people: individuals who were retired or
were saving for retirement, shareholders, and taxpayers whose taxes paid
for wasted court time.
Some of this can be blamed on Congress’s drafters—the Congressional
staff whose job it is to find the best wording for what legislators want to
enact. Both of the sections involved here contain a lot of wording that staff
drafters shouldn’t have used. And maybe those drafters should have
spotted the fool’s-errand cross-reference and pointed it out to the legislators who might have fixed it. But content is the legislators’ turf, which
they guard fiercely. When legislators insist on mind-numbing complexity
throughout a statute—of which a 41-concept definition is but one
example—perhaps we can empathize with drafters who were overwhelmed and missed the faulty cross-reference. Gibberish isn’t only in the
wording. It’s primarily in the thinking.

II. The Vacancies Reform Act: The Statute That Tied Up
Everyone Twice
This story’s human drama is so well known that we can omit the
details here. The essence is that in February of Year 1 of his presidency, a
President grew unhappy with an investigation going on in his Justice
Department. In March, the Attorney General recused himself from supervision over that investigation8 and delegated that responsibility to the

8 The reason offered at the time was a conflict of interest because of the Attorney General’s connection to political organizations being investigated. Another reason didn’t become public until two years later. The Attorney General himself became
one of the subjects of the investigation, regarding possible perjury and making false statements to Congress, although ultimately he was not indicted. SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER , III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, Vol. 1, at 197–98 (2019), https//www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf
[hereinafter MUELLER REPORT].
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Deputy Attorney General, who appointed a special counsel to take over
the investigation. This so deeply offended the President that for twenty
months—from March of Year 1 to November of Year 2—he subjected his
Attorney General to merciless humiliations, continually in public and
occasionally in private, in an apparent effort to provoke the Attorney
General into resigning so the President could appoint a new Attorney
General who would terminate the investigation.
During those twenty months, the President didn’t fire his Attorney
General, and the Attorney General didn’t resign9—behavior on both sides
that seemed inexplicable to everyone except the few people who realized
that, in a key place in the Vacancies Reform Act, the word dismiss doesn’t
appear.
In November of Year 2, the Attorney General finally did resign, and
the President named as Acting Attorney General a breathtakingly
unqualified person who had said many times previously in print and on
television that the special counsel’s investigation should be shut down.
That person was claimed by the administration to be Acting Attorney
General for three months before a new Attorney General was confirmed
by the Senate in February of Year 3. During those three months, there was
serious doubt about whether anybody was Acting Attorney General.
Throughout the whole story—from March of Year 1 to February of
Year 3—people kept looking at the Vacancies Reform Act for answers and
not finding them. On two issues crucial to the country and at the statute’s
core—its meaning was genuinely disputable. Any statute with that level of
opaqueness is a legislative failure. In a national crisis, the statute is a spectacular failure.
Presidentially-appointed offices become vacant all the time. Officials
die, retire, or quit to take more lucrative jobs. It can take months for a
successor to be nominated and then confirmed by the Senate. In the
meantime, who does the departed official’s job? Somebody must be able to
make decisions of the type the departed official had been making.
This is a relatively simple cluster of problems, at least compared to
others that legislatures must solve. Here’s how to do it: First, create one
simple formula that identifies the person who will automatically take over
the vacant position on an acting basis the moment it becomes vacant.
Make that formula so elegantly simple that it will work in every executive
branch department with every position normally filled by a Senate-

9 Actually, in one chaotic incident, the Attorney General did offer a resignation letter in May of Year 1, but the President was
persuaded not to accept it, a decision he quickly regretted. By coincidence, the FBI had just delivered an evidence-preservation notice to the White House Counsel. White House staff returned the letter to the Attorney General. MUELLER REPORT,
supra note 8, Vol. 2, at 79–80.
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approved Presidential appointee. Please don’t say that the executive
branch is too big and complicated for one formula to work. That’s an
excuse, not an explanation. Great law is made by finding the simple
solution. Mediocre law-making fails to do it. And horrible law results from
not even trying.
Second, create one simple backup formula that a President can use to
substitute someone else—just one formula, not three or four. If you pile on
alternate formulas to give a President flexibility, your statute will become
inefficiently complex. If you come up with a well-thought-out formula,
alternate ones shouldn’t be needed. After all, these are temporary
appointments to fill positions that are temporarily vacant.
Finally, provide for the miscellaneous details. Set deadlines, for
example.
Congress instead enacted a statute filled with mind-numbing
complexity. It includes tests with elements that seem to have mysterious
purposes; lists of exceptions combined with exceptions to exceptions; lists
of different categories of deadlines; complicated ways of extending
deadlines; limits that apply in different ways to extending different
deadlines; and cross-references to statutes that the Act doesn’t identify
and that might or might not apply, depending on the extent to which they
“expressly” authorize or designate something. There’s no effective way to
understand all this. The best you could do would be to put huge pieces of
paper on a wall and draw flow-chart diagrams. You might need an entire
wall and still not understand what you’re reading. While drawing those
diagrams, you’ll feel like sending texts to Congress saying “Simplify!
Simplify! Simplify!” Complexity raises the odds that both drafters and
readers will make mistakes. Bad actors will capitalize on accidental
loopholes, as they do in the tax code and virtually all other overly
complicated statutes. And good actors won’t be able to figure out how to
obey the law.
A. The Word That Isn’t There—“Dismiss”
Suppose you were the President. And suppose that a special counsel
was annoying you to the point that you want him gotten rid of. You might
not have the power to fire the special counsel. But the Attorney General
and, in this case, the Deputy Attorney General have that power. They
aren’t doing it, and you have the constitutional power to fire them.
The problem is replacing them with someone who will fire the special
counsel. You know that you have the power to nominate successors to be
approved by the Senate.10 But you want someone to take office imme-

10 U.S. CONST., art II, § 2, clause 2.
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diately and fire the special counsel within the hour, without waiting for
Senate approval. You also know that you can make recess appointments
while the Senate isn’t in session.11 But the Senate seems to go out of its way
to stay in session all the time. It doesn’t matter whether you’re a good
President or a bad one or whether your motivations are good ones or bad
ones. This is about bad law.
Other than recess appointments, your power to make temporary
appointments is in the Vacancies Reform Act, in title 5 of the U.S. Code.
The most interesting words for you are in bold italics below:
§ 3345. Acting officer
(a) If an officer of an Executive agency . . . whose appointment to
office is required to be made by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, dies, resigns, or is
otherwise unable to perform the functions and duties of
the office —
(1) the first assistant to the office of such officer shall
perform the functions and duties of the office
temporarily in an acting capacity . . . ;
(2) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President (and
only the President) may direct a person who serves
in an office for which appointment is required to be
made by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to perform the functions and
duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting
capacity . . .; or
(3) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President (and only
the President) may direct an officer or employee of
such Executive agency to perform the functions and
duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting
capacity, subject to the time limitations of section 3346,
if —
(A) during the 365-day period preceding the date of
death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve
of the applicable officer, the officer or employee
served in a position in such agency for not less
than 90 days; and
(B) the rate of pay for the position described under
subparagraph (A) is equal to or greater than the
minimum rate of pay payable for a position at
GS-15 of the General Schedule.

11 “The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting
Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.” U.S. CONST., art II, § 2, clause 3.
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Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) would seem wonderful to you if you want
to name an Acting Attorney General who will fire a special counsel within
the hour. Under (a)(2), you would be able to move into the Attorney
General’s office anybody who has already been confirmed by the Senate
for some other job. There are hundreds of such people.
But (a)(3) is even better. You would be able to do the same with any of
the thousands of Justice Department lawyers who have GS-15 rank and
have been in the Justice Department for at least 90 days. The statute seems
crystal clear.
No, it isn’t.
Three types of events trigger your power to name an acting officer:
death, resignation, or inability to perform the functions and duties of the
office. Dismissal by the President isn’t among them. The original wording,
from the 1868 Vacancies Act, was “in case of the death, resignation,
absence, or sickness.”12 Through various codifications and amendments,
the nouns became verbs: “dies, resigns, or is sick or absent.” But in
substance the list didn’t change for 130 years, until the Vacancies Reform
Act in 1998, when the list became what it is today: “dies, resigns, or is
otherwise unable to perform the functions and duties of the office.”
Resignation is by a large margin the most frequent method through
which vacancies are created. Far less common are death, disability without
resignation, and dismissal without resignation.13 All except dismissal are in
the statute. Dismissal without resignation isn’t, and the only relevant
Congressional committee report is silent about why.14 When a President
dismisses someone who doesn’t resign, how is the office to be filled
temporarily until a new office holder can be nominated and confirmed?
The “dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform the functions and
duties of the office” formulation occurs more than once in the Vacancies
Reform Act. Wherever the list appears, the gap recurs, and the consequences of its absence recur. Notice the bold italicized words here:
§ 3348. Vacant office
....
(b) Unless an officer or employee is performing the functions
and duties in accordance with sections 3345, 3346, and 3347,
if an officer of an Executive agency . . . whose appointment to

12 Act of July 23, 1868, ch. 227, 15 Stat. 168–69.
13 The genteel way of firing an incumbent officer, saving face for both sides, is for someone from the White House to tell the
officer something like “The President wants your resignation,” after which the officer writes a cordial letter resigning and
expressing gratitude for the opportunity to serve, etc. That letter would satisfy § 3345(a). But if an Attorney General refuses
to write such a letter when fired, the President can’t make a § 3345(a)(2) or (3) appointment.
14 Report of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs to Accompany S. 2176, S. REP. No. 105-250 (1998).
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office is required to be made by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, dies, resigns, or is
otherwise unable to perform the functions and duties of
the office —
(1) the office shall remain vacant . . . .
....
(d)(1) An action taken by any person who is not acting under
section 3345, 3346, or 3347, or as provided by subsection
(b) [of this section], in the performance of any function or
duty of a vacant office . . . shall have no force or effect.
Under Justice Department regulations, only an Attorney General can
fire a Special Counsel.15 If someone is claimed to be an Acting Attorney
General in circumstances that don’t satisfy the Vacancies Reform Act, any
attempt by that person to fire a Special Counsel will have “no force and
effect” under 5 U.S.C. § 3348(d)(1).
The Supreme Court—in NLRB v. SW General, Inc.,16 the main case
interpreting the Act—held that nullifying an officer’s actions under
3348(d)(1) is the Act’s remedy for violations. In a seven-to-two decision
and in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court nullified an action by
an acting NLRB general counsel on exactly that reasoning.
Sometimes the most important words are the ones that weren’t
drafted. Was this a careless oversight? Or did Congress do it on purpose,
perhaps with great foresight, to prevent a President from abusing power
by firing a cabinet officer and then bypassing the Senate by making a GS15 civil service employee an acting cabinet officer for 210 days, which is
the time allowed for a temporary appointment under the statute.17
If Congress left out dismissal on purpose, why didn’t Congress tell us
that? It would be so easy to do (see Chart 1).
Chart 1
What the statute says

“an officer . . . dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to
perform the functions and duties of the office”

What it could have said

“an officer is unable to perform the functions and duties
of the office, or the office becomes vacant for a reason
other than dismissal by the President without the
officeholder’s resignation”

15 “The Special Counsel may be . . . removed from office only by the personal action of the Attorney General [and only] for
misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or for other good cause . . . .” 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(d)(2019).
16 137 S. Ct. 929 (2017).
17 5 U.S.C. § 3346(a).
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Aside from a single comment in floor debate by Senator Fred
Thompson, the principal sponsor of the bill that became the Vacancies
Reform Act, no explanation appears in the legislative history. Here’s the
comment:
[T]he Doolin court stated that the current [statute] does not apply when
the officer is fired, and for similar reasons, it might not apply when the
officer is in jail if he does not resign. To make the law cover all situations
when the officer cannot perform his duties, the “unable to perform the
functions and duties of the office” language was selected.18

Thompson’s theory seems to have been that an officer who has been
fired is “unable to perform the functions and duties of the office.” Courts
have at least four reasons to ignore this (listed in the footnote).19
Regarding another comment about the Act made in the same speech by
the same senator, the Supreme Court held that “floor statements by individual legislators rank among the least illuminating forms of legislative
history.”20
If the President had fired his Attorney General and then named a
temporary replacement under the Act, litigation would have followed
immediately. Privately the judges involved would have been grumbling
about Congress leaving it to courts to clean up Congress’s mess. And
publicly those judges would have written opinions parsing Congress’s
mysteries with reasoning like this (which, fortunately for the judges here,
they didn’t have to write):
Congress repeated the list several times in the statute and each time
omitted firing, and Congress knows how to spell “dismissed by the
President” when it wants to write those words.

Courts determine legislative intent using this type of reasoning. It’s a
game courts are forced to play. Often, as here, there is no legislative intent.
Nobody knows why firing isn’t on the list. Congress didn’t really know why
it did what it did.

18 144 CONG. REC . S12,823 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (statement of Sen. Thompson). The reference is to Doolin Security
Savings Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
19 First, the committee report says nothing on this subject. Second, there’s no evidence that other co-sponsors agreed with
Thompson’s comment. Third, the House of Representatives couldn’t consider his comment because the House had already
passed the bill. Fourth, Thompson misquoted the Doolin court, which said nothing about officers being fired. And even if the
court had said anything, it would have been dicta because nobody in Doolin had been fired.
20 NLRB v. SW Gen. Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 943 (2017).
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B. Changing “Application” to “Exclusivity” and Getting the
Opposite of What the Drafter Wanted
Finally, after 20 months of verbal abuse by the President, the Attorney
General in our story did resign in November of Year 2. The President then
used § 3345(a)(3) to appoint, as Acting Attorney General, the breathtakingly unqualified person mentioned earlier.
The Vacancies Reform Act isn’t the only way that presidentiallyappointed offices are filled temporarily. The Act includes this (bold italics
added):
§ 3347. Exclusivity
(a) Sections 3345 and 3346 are the exclusive means for temporarily
authorizing an acting official to perform the functions and duties of
any office of an Executive agency . . . for which appointment is
required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, unless —
(1) a statutory provision expressly . . .
(B) designates an officer or employee to perform the functions and
duties of a specified office temporarily in an acting capacity . . . .

For Attorneys General, such a statutory provision exists. Under 28
U.S.C. § 508(a), if the Attorney General is fired, the Deputy Attorney
General would become the Acting Attorney General. Note the bold italics:
§ 508. Vacancies
(a) In case of a vacancy in the office of Attorney General, or of his
absence or disability, the Deputy Attorney General may exercise all
the duties of that office . . . .

Chart 2 shows the difference between the two statutes’ lists of vacancy
predicates (see Chart 2 ).
Chart 2
Statute

Vacancy Predicate

Consequence if the predicate is satisfied

5 U.S.C.
§ 3345(a)

“dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to
perform the functions and duties of the
office” (Firing the incumbent isn’t in
this list.)

The President can exercise the powers in
(a)(2) or (a)(3)

28 U.S.C.
§ 508(a)

“a vacancy in the office of Attorney
General, or . . . his absence or disability”
(Because this statute doesn’t list causes
for vacancies, a vacancy created by the
President in firing the incumbent would
satisfy this vacancy predicate.)

The Deputy Attorney General becomes
Acting Attorney General
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But the Deputy Attorney General was exactly the person the
President didn’t want. It was the Deputy Attorney General who had
appointed the special counsel who so outraged the President. What if a
President were to fire both the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney
General? That would be governed by § 508(b):
(b) When by reason of absence, disability, or vacancy in office, neither
the Attorney General nor the Deputy Attorney General is available to
exercise the duties of the office of Attorney General, the Associate
Attorney General shall act as Attorney General. The Attorney General
may designate the Solicitor General and the Assistant Attorneys General,
in further order of succession, to act as Attorney General.

Thus, under 28 U.S.C. § 508(a), the powers of the Attorney General
can be exercised by the Deputy Attorney General or Associate Attorney
General or, if those offices are both vacant, by someone in a line of
succession created under § 508(b) by the Attorney General before he was
fired, or, if all those people have been fired, by someone named in an
Executive Order.21
Because the Attorney General finally resigned in November of Year 2,
the Vacancies Reform Act was finally activated—maybe. What about
§ 508(a)? The two statutes lead to different results. Which one controls?
For three months, until an Attorney General was finally confirmed,
motions were filed in various courts, including the Supreme Court, asking
for orders declaring that the person whom the President claimed to be the
Acting Attorney General was not actually the Acting Attorney General. If
that turned out to be true, under § 3348(d), every document he signed
would be void. Judges procrastinated ruling on these motions, apparently
hoping for a quick appointment of a real Attorney General. If the
purported Acting Attorney General had purported to fire the special
counsel,22 there would have been turmoil, and nobody would really know
who in the Justice Department had authority.
How did Congress create this mess? The only way to answer that
question is to tell the Vacancies Reform Act’s story.
During the Clinton administration, vacancies in positions requiring
Senate confirmation were increasingly being filled on a theoretically

21 On March 31, 2017, the President issued Executive Order 13,787 adding three U.S. Attorneys at the end of the line of
succession “to act as Attorney General” if all the officers named in 28 U.S.C. § 508, plus all those designated by the Attorney
General exercising § 508’s authority, are unable to act—for example in a disaster affecting Washington. This is unremarkable.
The two preceding Presidents had issued similar executive orders (numbered 13,481, 13,557, and 13,762).
22 The reason he didn’t might be the same reason the President’s aides refused to carry out his orders to fire the Attorney
General and the special counsel. The aides could have been indicted for obstruction of justice. See MUELLER REPORT, supra
note 8, Vol. II, at 77–120.
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temporary basis by people who hadn’t been confirmed by the Senate for
anything, much less the jobs they were temporarily filling. This happened
partly because of Clinton’s presidential style and partly because the
Republican majority in the Senate was increasingly less willing to observe
the tradition of deferring to a President’s desires in executive branch
appointments. In 1997, about one in five positions requiring Senate
confirmation were being occupied on a temporary basis by people who
had not been Senate-confirmed,23 and many of them were working in
violation of the Vacancies Act then in effect.24 The Justice Department was
the object of much of the Senate’s blame, both because of the number of
DOJ positions being filled temporarily and because for a decade or more
DOJ had considered itself exempt from the Vacancies Act and had
encouraged other departments to take the same position.25 For Senate
Republicans, the breaking point came in December 1997 when Bill Lann
Lee was appointed Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights
despite the fact that the Senate Judiciary Committee had refused to
approve his nomination for the job on a permanent basis. Lee was thoroughly qualified, but he was anathema to the Senate Republican majority.
In June 1998, Senator Thompson,26 of Tennessee, introduced S. 2176,
the bill that would become the Vacancies Reform Act.27 His principal cosponsor was Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, who had been majority
leader when Democrats controlled the Senate. The bill was referred to the
Committee on Governmental Affairs, which Thompson chaired. In July,
the Committee reported out the bill with minor changes.28
Both versions of the bill—the one Thompson introduced in June and
the one the Committee reported out in July—included this sentence, as
§ 3345(c):

23 Although the Trump administration’s statistics fluctuate, they often exceed the Clinton percentages. Senate Republicans,
however, do not complain.
24 Morton Rosenberg, The New Vacancies Act: Congress Acts to Protect the Senate’s Confirmation Prerogative, 4
(Congressional Research Service 1998). In March 1998, Rosenberg had testified before the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee in favor of the bill that would become the Vacancies Reform Act. In January 2019, he filed an amicus brief in the
Supreme Court arguing, in Michaels v. Whitaker that Matthew Whitaker’s appointment as Acting Attorney General violated
the law because the operative statute was 28 U.S.C. § 508 and not the Vacancies Reform Act. The Supreme Court never ruled
on the issue.
25 S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 3 (1998).
26 Before election to the Senate, Thompson had been counsel to the Republicans on the Senate Watergate Committee.
During the televised Watergate hearings, he was frequently seen by millions of viewers interrogating witnesses. Later he
became an actor in movies such as Die Hard 2 and The Hunt for Red October, and he became a regular on the television
drama Law & Order.
27 144 CONG. REC. S6413–16 (daily ed. June 16, 1998).
28 S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 9–11.
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With respect to the office of the Attorney General of the United States,
the provisions of section 508 of title 28 shall be applicable.

The Committee report explained (italics added) —
With respect to a vacancy in the office of Attorney General, 28
U.S.C. § 508 will remain applicable. That section ensures that
Senate-confirmed Justice Department officials will be the only
persons eligible to serve as Acting Attorney General.29
Remember: Thompson, Byrd, and a number of other senators were
incensed that people who hadn’t been confirmed by the Senate were in
charge of major units in the Justice Department, holding, on an endlessly
temporary basis, positions that were supposed to require Senate confirmation.
In the Committee’s bill, § 3347 was titled “Application” and in part
provided that —
(a) Sections 3345 and 3346 are applicable to any office of an Executive
agency . . . for which appointment is required to be made by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, unless
—
(1) . . .
(2) a statutory provision in effect on the date of enactment of
[this Act] expressly —
(A) . . .
(B) designates an officer or employee to perform the
functions and duties of a specified office temporarily in
an acting capacity.30

In two separate ways, the Committee’s bill would have unambiguously
forbidden the purported Acting Attorney General appointment in
November of Year 2.
One way would have been through the bill’s § 3345(c) and its crossreference to 28 U.S.C. § 508 as the method of designating an Acting
Attorney General. Under § 508, the Deputy Attorney General, a position
requiring Senate confirmation, automatically becomes the Acting
Attorney General.
The other way would have been through the bill’s § 3347(a)(2)(B) and
its general cross-reference to all statutes like 28 U.S.C. § 508. The
Vacancies Reform Act would apply unless some other statute designates

29 Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
30 Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
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an officer or employee to fill a vacancy temporarily. That’s what 28 U.S.C.
§ 508 and other statutes do.
On September 25, the Committee’s bill came up for debate, and
several senators, including Thompson, submitted amendments.31 One of
Thompson’s amendments would delete § 3347(a)’s “are applicable to” and
substitute “are the exclusive means for temporarily authorizing an acting
official to perform the functions and duties.” Clearing away all but the
basics, this is the wording Thompson’s amendment would produce:
Sections 3345 and 3346 are the exclusive means for temporarily
authorizing an acting official . . . unless . . . a statutory provision in effect
on the date of enactment of [this Act] expressly . . . designates an officer
or employee to perform the functions and duties of a specified office
temporarily in an acting capacity.

Thompson wanted his bill to control as much temporary office-filling
as possible to prevent presidential manipulation. Exclusive sounds so
much more powerful than applicable. But substituting exclusive for
applicable actually had the opposite effect.
The bill was—and the Vacancies Reform Act is—so convoluted that
there’s plenty of room inside it for presidential manipulation. But positionspecific statutes like 28 U.S.C. § 508 are much simpler; they mostly operate
automatically; and there’s far less room for manipulation because they
typically put people who are already Senate-confirmed for their current
jobs into acting positions to fill a vacancy temporarily. The applicable . . .
unless wording would have caused the maximum number of vacancies to
be filled that way.
But the exclusive . . . unless wording would—and later did—create
ambiguity. If two statutes cover the same vacancy when the Act isn’t
exclusive, which statute outranks the other one? Thompson’s amendment
would make the Attorney General’s position subject to both the Act and
28 U.S.C. § 508 without any indication of which statute would outrank the
other. The Congressional Record doesn’t show a vote on Thompson’s
amendment, but he later put it in the bill when it was enacted via a House
appropriations bill. The ambiguity might have been cleared up by the
explicit sentence in the bill’s § 3345(c): “With respect to the office of the
Attorney General of the United States, the provisions of section 508 of

31 144 CONG. REC. S10,996–97 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1998).
32 144 Id. at S11,021–38. The debate is charming. There’s a relaxed civility among the senators. They graciously yield to each
other as friendly colleagues with no apparent party tensions, although there was a party division on the bill. Senator Byrd,
who affected classical oratory, tells, in his unique style, a long story about seven youths who fled persecution in ancient
Greece and ended up sleeping in a cave for 187 years, believing they had been asleep for only one night, the story leading to
Byrd’s moral that the Senate has been sleeping on its rights versus the Executive branch.
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title 28 shall be applicable.” But that sentence later disappeared from the
version of the bill that became law.
On September 28, after some floor discussion,32 the bill was headed
toward a filibuster, and a cloture motion failed to muster the three-fifths
majority needed to cut off debate. Clinton had threatened to veto it
anyway. The bill appeared comatose, if not dead.
Then Thompson, perhaps with Byrd, made an end-run around both
the Senate and Clinton.33 Thompson went to the House and got his bill
folded into a 920-page House omnibus appropriations bill34 that was so
vast that the Senate couldn’t pick it apart and Clinton couldn’t veto it
without shuttering federal agencies awaiting their operating funds. Other
people had done the same thing with their pet bills. The Vacancies Reform
Act is on pages 612–17 of the House bill, just ahead of the American
Fisheries Act, which regulates commercial fishing vessels in ways so
convoluted as to be incomprehensible.
In the House’s mega-appropriations bill, the § 508 sentence—“With
respect to the office of the Attorney General of the United States, the
provisions of section 508 of title 28 shall be applicable”—had disappeared.
There seems to be no record of how or why it disappeared. If it had stayed
in the bill, Matthew Whitaker would never have been Acting Attorney
General.
The House passed the appropriations bill on October 20. The next
day, the Senate passed it, and Clinton signed it.35
That is how Congress made a mess of the Vacancies Reform Act. It
wasn’t just sloppy work. It was unprofessional. When judges make law,
they are expected to act like professionals. No such expectation is applied
to Congress. We will explore that in this article’s part V.

III. Congress Still Hasn’t Mastered the Basics of How
to Create a Crime
Chart 3 presents five commonly used methods36 of creating a crime
and its punishment (see Chart 3).

33 There appears to have been some negotiation between the bill’s sponsors and the Clinton administration.
34 H.R. 4328, which became the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277 (1998).
35 October 21 was also the day on which the House Judiciary Committee decided to begin impeachment proceedings against
Clinton.
36 Every method except C uses declarations. A declaration creates a status or legal situation by declaring it to be true, often
with a form of the verb to be.
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Chart 3
Method A
(a declaration)

“Whoever [does X] shall be [fined, imprisoned, etc.].
or
“A person who [does X] shall be fined, imprisoned, etc.].

Method B
(a declaration)

“It is unlawful to [do X].”
[A nearby sentence or section will set out the punishment.]

Method C
(a duty)

VARIATION 1: “A person shall not [do X].”
[A nearby sentence or section will set out the punishment for
doing X and thus violating this negative duty.]
VARIATION 2: “A person shall [do X].”
[A nearby sentence or section will set out the punishment for
not doing X and thus failing to perform this affirmative duty.]

Method D
(a declaration)

“A person who [does X] is guilty of [crime Y]. [Crime Y] is a
[Class B felony or Class A misdemeanor].”
[A group of sections elsewhere in the criminal code will set out
the punishments for each Class.]

Method E
(a declaration)

“A person is guilty of [crime Y] if the person [does X].
[Crime Y] is a [Class B felony or Class A misdemeanor].”
[A group of sections elsewhere in the criminal code will set out
the punishments for each Class.]

Methods D and E are infinitely better than the others. They give each
crime a name as part of a system of classifying crimes with uniform
punishments, which most states have done. Method E is better than D
because it gets the reader to the verb quickly, and an English-language
sentence makes sense only after the reader has found the verb.
Congress uses Method A—by far the worst method—to create most
of the crimes in title 18, the federal criminal code. Here is an example.
(Find the verb.)
§ 1503. Influencing or injuring officer or juror generally.
(a) Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening
letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or
impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the
United States, or officer who may be serving at any examination or
other proceeding before any United States magistrate judge or other
committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any
such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of any
verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being
or having been such juror, or injures any such officer, magistrate
judge, or other committing magistrate in his person or property on
account of the performance of his official duties, or corruptly or by
threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication,
influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence,
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obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be
punished as provided in subsection (b).

Where is the empathy in this sentence? Good writing is built on
empathy—an ability to see words as a reader will and to write and rewrite
until the words satisfy the reader’s needs and cause the reader to feel
gratitude at having been helped. Congress has no empathy for its readers,
a situation that should shock us for two reasons. First, a legislature’s
readers are the millions of people who must comply with what the legislature writes. Lack of empathy for their needs is self-defeating because it
sabotages the legislature’s own goals. Second, most law can be expressed
in words that educated lay readers can understand (which Appendix B
illustrates). Legislatures are a unique category of authors who are elected
by their own readers. A legislature that writes in a way that shows not just
lack of empathy but also contempt for reader needs undermines
democracy.
For some crimes, Congress breaks out of its addiction to Method A.
For some title 18 crimes, it uses Method B. An example is the RICO
statute (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations), also in title 18:
§ 1962. Prohibited activities
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity37 . . .
to use or invest . . . any part of such income . . . in acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce. . . .

Sometimes Congress can be ambidextrous, using two methods in the
same section. Tucked away in an obscure corner of the Tax Code38 is a
statute in which Congress uses Method B to create a crime in subsection
(a) and Method C to create a different crime in subsection (b).
§ 7217. Prohibition on executive branch influence over
taxpayer audits and other investigations
(a) Prohibition. — It shall be unlawful for any applicable person
to request, directly or indirectly, any officer or employee of
the Internal Revenue Service to conduct or terminate an

37 Section 1961(B) defines “racketeering activity” to include, among others, obstruction of justice; obstruction of criminal
investigations; tampering with or retaliating against a witness, victim, or informant; mail fraud; wire fraud; and money laundering. Under § 1963, every asset a defendant has acquired through RICO violations can be forfeited to the government.
38 Title 26 of the U.S. Code.
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audit or other investigation of any particular taxpayer with
respect to the tax liability of such taxpayer.
Reporting requirement. — Any officer or employee of the
Internal Revenue Service receiving any request prohibited by
subsection (a) shall report the receipt of such request to the
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration.
Exceptions. . . .
Penalty. — Any person who willfully violates subsection (a)
or fails to report under subsection (b) shall be punished upon
conviction by a fine in any amount not exceeding $5,000, or
imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both, together
with the costs of prosecution.
Applicable person. — For purposes of this section, the term
“applicable person” means —
(1) the President,39 the Vice President, any employee of the
executive office of the President, and any employee of
the executive office of the Vice President; and
(2) any individual (other than the Attorney General of the
United States) serving in a position specified in section
5312 of title 5, United States Code.

Congress is making two kinds of mistakes. One is using three different
methods of creating crimes. The other is using the worst possible method
for the overwhelming majority of the crimes it creates. Most states use
one—and only one—of the five methods. And most states use Method D
or Method E, the most effective two of the five.
But Congress has also done something well here. Section 7217 is a
lean, simple statute with a clarity and economy unlike any of the other
Congressional enactments discussed in this article. It might be drafted in
an odd way, but it’s the opposite of gibberish.

IV. Obstruction of Justice
A. The Big Picture
Here’s a list, from title 18 of the U.S. Code, of the federal cover-up
crimes—the ones for which people are indicted and convicted during
national political scandals. They are all reproduced in Appendix A.
§ 4.
Misprision of felony
§ 1001. Statements or entries generally

39 In the controversy over whether a President can be prosecuted for exercising what the Constitution calls “The executive
Power [that is] vested in a President” (Article II, § 1), it seems unnoticed that Congress has created a crime specifically for
Presidents.
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§ 1503.
§ 1504.
§ 1510.
§ 1512.
§ 1513.
§ 1515.
§ 1521.

Influencing or injuring officer or juror generally
Influencing juror by writing
Obstruction of criminal investigations
Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant
Retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant
Definitions for certain provisions; general provision
Retaliating against a Federal judge or Federal law
enforcement officer by false claim or slander of title
§ 1622. Subornation of perjury

When significant numbers of people are being indicted for various
types of obstruction of justice, you might want a detailed scorecard that
would help you follow the action through pre-trial motions, trials, and
appeals. Appendix A should provide that scorecard. These crimes
shouldn’t be hard to understand. They cover simple things like falsifying
evidence and threatening witnesses. Try to read Appendix A. Will it help
you follow obstruction of justice scandals and explain them to your family
and friends?
These sections contain so many crimes with overlapping elements
that the total effect is incoherence. Reading them is like trying to find your
way through a labyrinth. Over decades Congress has enacted new sections
or amended existing ones with no attempt to coordinate them and limit
the number of concepts involved. It has just thrown concepts onto a page.
That’s not writing—it’s typing.40
I redrafted all the Appendix A obstruction of justice statutes, and the
redraft is in Appendix B. It’s not the best conceivable drafting. It’s just
what a good drafter would be able to do if the drafter were permitted to
rewrite all the relevant sections from scratch, which our legislatures
usually don’t permit their staff drafters to do. Not allowing drafters to do
that might be one of the reasons why our statutes become more complex
as they are continually amended.
In the Appendix B redraft, simplifying not only created clarity but also
cut the number of words in half:
Appendix A (current law) — 2,193 words
Appendix B (the redraft) —

1,107 words

Some of the shrinkage is because Appendix B’s wording is more
concise. But most of the shrinkage is because Appendix B has fewer
concepts.

40 Truman Capote’s description of Jack Kerouac’s work. FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 1, at 129.
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For example, Congress frequently criminalizes both an act and an
attempt to commit the act. An attempt is an inchoate crime. It equals
trying plus failing to succeed. Criminal law treats completing a crime and
attempting it as mutually exclusive. Succeeding and failing don’t overlap. If
you want to penalize both success and failure, the usual drafting method is
to create two crimes, perhaps punishing a failed attempt less than a
successful one. But with obstruction of justice crimes—reprinted here in
Appendix A—Congress unaccountably combines the two, using the
formula “do x or attempt to do x.” This is inefficient, and Congress knows
better because with one obstruction of justice crime Congress has used a
brilliant solution.
For nearly two centuries—since 1831—18 U.S.C. § 1503 has contained
an ingenious method of creating one crime in place of two, which
Congress seems not to have realized even though it created the method.
Instead of using the word attempt, § 1503 uses the word endeavor. The
complete crime definition is quoted earlier in this article.41 Here’s the key
wording, which courts call the omnibus clause:
corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to
influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice

For at least the last century, courts have seized on this use of endeavor
to hold that in § 1503 success is irrelevant and that a defendant is just as
guilty for trying as for succeeding. The courts reason that because
Congress didn’t say attempt, it meant something other than the inchoate
crime of attempt. This is from a 1921 Supreme Court case:
The word of the section is “endeavor,” and by using it the section got rid of
the technicalities which might be urged as besetting the word “attempt,”
and it describes any effort or essay to do or accomplish the evil purpose
that the section was enacted to prevent. . . . The section . . . is not directed
at success in corrupting a juror, but at the “endeavor” to do so.42

Attempt has an exact meaning in criminal law. Endeavor has none of
attempt’s baggage, and the courts had to invent a meaning for it.
Essentially the courts are reading the statute like this:
corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to
influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice

41 See supra text accompanying notes 36 and 37.
42 United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138, 143 (1921) (emphasis added). “This is not to say that the defendant’s actions need be
successful; an ‘endeavor’ suffices.” United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995). “The ‘endeavor’ element of the offense
describes any attempt or effort to obstruct justice.” United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1990) (emphasis
added).
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Because Congress used endeavor rather than attempt, courts are able
to ignore the words crossed out above. Trying makes you guilty, and
§ 1503 doesn’t care whether you succeed or fail.
Congress probably did this by accident. Nobody today knows why a
drafter in 1831 wrote endeavor rather than attempt. The statute obviously
mentions succeeding (“influences, obstructs, or impedes”) separately from
trying (“endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede”).
Maybe the drafter thought endeavor and attempt meant the same
thing. Maybe to many people in 1831, they actually did mean the same
thing, and endeavor seemed the more genteel way of saying it. Or maybe it
was style. The drafter might just have liked endeavor more than attempt
and didn’t wonder about the similarities or differences in meaning. Or
maybe the drafter actually meant that trying completes the crime and
success or the lack of it is irrelevant. That actually seems like the least
likely explanation. Why would the drafter have mentioned success
(“influences, obstructs, or impedes”) if the drafter meant it to be
irrelevant?
It doesn’t really matter why the drafter wrote endeavor. Whether by
accident or by design, the drafter—and therefore Congress—invented a
two-fer, a way of getting one concept to do the work of two. Actually
endeavor is a three-fer. Using endeavor reduces three concepts to one.
Endeavor includes both trying and succeeding, making it unnecessary to
criminalize both the act and the attempt. And endeavor also includes the
concept of knowingly. If you make an effort (endeavor) to do something,
inherent in making the effort is knowing that you are making it: you are
trying to accomplish a specific goal.
Where Congress has criminalized equally both an act and the attempt
in the same section—invariably in the same sentence—the Appendix B
redraft uses endeavor instead, eliminating also any knowingly
requirements. This is how drafters simplify—by using the smallest
number of concepts that will get the job done. Bloated drafting isn’t
caused only by too many words. It’s also caused by too many concepts.
Here Congress was using three concepts to do the work of one.
Section 1503 was the original obstruction of justice statute. All the
others came afterward. In every later statute, Congress ignored the efficiency of its own accidental invention.
When it enacted the later sections, why didn’t Congress do what the
Appendix B redraft does with its own brilliant but accidental invention of
endeavor? Surely Congress reads the case law—the way Broadway stage
actors read critics’ reviews—and should have been pleasantly surprised at
how well its accidental invention has worked out when courts interpret
§ 1503. Maybe Congress doesn’t read case law. Or maybe Congress reads
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it, but simplicity isn’t something Congress would value or even notice
when courts recognize it.
Other aspects of the redraft—and there are many—are explained in
Appendix B’s footnotes, which develop this article’s analysis.
B. The Dispute between Mueller and Barr about the Word
“Otherwise”
In June 2018, while still a private citizen, William Barr wrote a 19page unsolicited memo43 complaining that Robert Mueller’s investigation
was, among other things, based on a wrong-headed interpretation of the
word otherwise as Congress used it in 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). This has
come to be known as the “audition memo” because it was unsolicited and
Barr handled it in a way that suggested that he himself wanted to be
appointed Attorney General.
A long passage in the Mueller Report, apparently written after Barr
eventually became Attorney General (and Mueller’s supervisor), is
devoted to refuting Barr’s interpretation of otherwise.44 The two
documents read like dueling appellate briefs on the issue. Analyzing the
true meaning of otherwise would require a separate law review article in
itself. Here it’s enough to point out that Congress made two mistakes and
the mistakes embroiled everyone in uncertainty about which crime a
President might have committed.
Section 1503, the original obstruction of justice statute, applies only to
obstruction connected to a judicial proceeding. In 2002, as a result of the
Enron-Arthur Anderson scandal, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, adding 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) to cover obstruction not connected to a
judicial proceeding.45 This was Congress’s first mistake. The simple
solution would have been to amend § 1503, changing or adding only a
phrase or two. But as usual, Congress chose the complicated solution,
which created unnecessary issues about the relation between and relative
scope of the two sections. Prosecutors and courts now must make unnecessary decisions about which statute has been violated and whether there’s
a gray zone between them where bad behavior falls between cracks and
actually hasn’t been criminalized.

43 Memorandum from Bill Barr to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (June 8, 2018), https//documentcloud.org/
documents/5638848-June-2018-Barr-Memo-to-DOJ-Muellers-Obstruction.html.
44 MUELLER REPORT, supra note 8, Vol. 2, at 160–68.
45 Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as a Case Study, 96 J. C RIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 643 (2006). Title 18 is “a haphazard grab-bag of statutes accumulated over 200 years, rather than a comprehensive, thoughtful, and internally consistent system of criminal law.” Id. at 643.
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Congress’s second mistake was to use the word otherwise in
§ 1512(c)(2), following a list of specific acts in (c)(1). This is such a
common mistake that a substantial amount of case law has been created—
unnecessarily—to decide what otherwise means when used to introduce
an omnibus general item at the end of a list of specific items. The case law
is described in great detail in Barr’s audition memo and in the Mueller
Report’s rebuttal.
These two mistakes aren’t just legislative sloppiness. Given the stakes
involved, they are displays of legislative incompetence. We expect this
kind of thing from our legislatures, and lawyers and courts are used to
cleaning up legislative messes. But it is incompetence, and in some other
countries it occurs much less frequently.46

V. Why Congress Drafts This Way
Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication.
— headline on the brochure introducing the Apple II computer
(1978)47
Complexity leads to more complexity.
— Richard A. Givens48
Keep it simple, stupid.
— the KISS principle in engineering, created by Kelly Johnson,49
from the common experience that malfunctions occur more
often in complex systems than in simple ones performing
similar tasks.
Clutter and confusion are failures of design . . . .
—Edward Tufte50
Simplicity is the shortest path to a solution. . . . [A] lot of simplicity comes
from knowing what matters and what doesn’t matter.
— Ward Cunningham51

46 For examples, see Reed Dickerson, Legislative Drafting: American and British Practices Compared, 44 A.B.A.J. 865 (1958)
and Richard K. Neumann Jr., Legislation’s Culture, 119 W. VA . L. REV. 397 (2016) (France and Sweden). The poet Paul Valery
said that the French Civil Code is “the greatest book of French literature,” and the novelist Stendhal read it daily as an example
of precision and clarity that he had set as a benchmark for himself while writing The Charterhouse of Parma. Neumann, 119
W. VA. L. REV. at 403, 408. The British Parliament’s drafting manual sets out an exemplary method of statute creation. OFFICE
OF THE PARLIAMENTARY COUNSEL, DRAFTING GUIDANCE (2017).
47 Curated by the Computer History Museum, http://www.computerhistory.org/collections/catalog/102637933.
48 Richard A. Givens, Legal Simplification, 68 N.Y. ST. B.J. 26, 26 (Oct. 1996).
49 BEN R. RICH, Clarence Leonard (Kelly) Johnson, 1910–1990, A Biographical Memoir (National Academy of Sciences).
50 EDWARD TUFTE, ENVISIONING INFORMATION 51 (1990).
51 Bill Venners, The Simplest Thing That Could Possibly Work: A Conversation with Ward Cunningham, Part V (concerning
software programming) at https://www.artima.com/intv/simplest2.html.
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Our life is frittered away by detail. . . . Simplify, simplify.
— Henry David Thoreau52
Abair ach beagan is abair gu math e.
(Say but little and say it well.)
— Gaelic proverb, posted on a wall in the Scottish Parliament’s
drafters’ office.53

Drafting is designing. A contract or statute is intellectual machinery—
a machine made up of ideas geared together. It should produce the results
we want whenever we use it. It shouldn’t waste fuel (require unnecessary
effort to understand, comply with, or enforce). It should be reliable. It
should work right.
Simple solutions, if well chosen, work better than complex ones. To
achieve simplicity, a drafter figures out the few things that really matter,
uses them, and throws away the rest as clutter. A confused drafter uses
every relevant concept because that drafter can’t tell the difference
between what really matters and clutter. What separates those two
drafters is that one knows how to design and the other doesn’t.
Simplicity isn’t simplistic. It’s sophisticated. Simplicity is a professional skill, and in legislation, it’s a hard one to master.
Legislating is made up of two functions— designing law and
enacting it. A lot of legislative incoherence is caused by mistakenly
conflating the two functions.
Designing law is diagnosing the problems a statute would address;
building a set of legal rules that would best do that; finding the best words
to express those rules; and producing, in writing, a product suitable for
enactment. These require a set of professional skills, most especially
mastery in the wise use of rules with the foresight to predict what will
work and what won’t. (This is one of the reasons why teaching drafting
involves teaching high-level problem-solving skills.)
Enacting law is deciding whether the designers’ product should
become law. Enacting provides legitimacy. Those who enact are elected by
the public and are responsible to the public. If they make bad enactment
decisions, the public can replace them. Professional expertise isn’t particularly relevant to good enacting and might even be a hindrance to political
credibility. Deciding whether to enact is intuitive work—intuition about
what’s right and wrong and about what the public will accept as fair and
reasonable. The finest intuition is priceless, and your favorite legislators
probably have it.

52 HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN, Ch. 2 (1854).
53 Andy Beattie, Why Drafting Matters, in PARLIAMENTARY C OUNSEL OFFICE , DRAFTING M ATTERS! (2d ed.),
https://www.gov.scot/publications/drafting-matters.
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Fred Thompson and Robert Byrd were masters at enacting law. They
knew the Senate and all its rules backwards and forwards. They had
enormous credibility with their constituencies. And, in a narrow sense,
they had reasonable judgment about choosing policy goals. But, if the
Vacancies Reform Act is typical of their work, they were amateurish rather
than professional law designers.
In our legislatures, those who enact also do most of the designing. But
winning an election isn’t evidence that a legislator has professional lawdesigning skills or even realizes that they exist as a skill set. An election
isn’t a professional licensing exam. It establishes legitimacy.
Chaos. When Victoria Nourse and Jane Schecter interviewed
Congressional drafters, they heard comments like these,
Staffers repeatedly told us that there was often insufficient time to
achieve textual clarity: “Time pressure . . . is the key here. . . . This
pressure leads to errors, inertia, [and] not understanding completely the
potential . . . pitfalls” of a law. When bills are drafted on the floor or in
conference, time pressures can be intense; a staffer may have only “thirty
minutes to get something done” on a “high profile issue.” Another
reported that she might get the actual text only twenty minutes before
the vote: “This happened with the juvenile-crime bill, when the stuff on
gun shows came out of the woodwork, and there was no time to even
check what the current law is. So sometimes you can’t be more clear
because you don’t know what you’re addressing.”54

This isn’t a professional process designed to produce professionalquality work. It’s an amateurish process and produces gibberish.

VI. Conclusion
These problems—a chaotic process and law being designed
amateurishly—typically don’t occur in some parliamentary systems, where
law is designed professionally in the executive branch, or by separate
commissions, and presented to the legislature for enactment.55
Parliaments aren’t, however, being used as rubber stamps. A parliament
chooses from its own members the cabinet that controls the executive
branch.

54 Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
575, 595 (2002). For somewhat different views, see Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of
Legislative Drafting, 114 COL. L. REV. 807 (2014) and Ganesh Sitaraman, The Origins of Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
79 (2015).
55 For an example (Sweden), see Neumann, supra note 46, at 418–21.
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Maybe we should treat legislative drafters with a bit more respect. In
most U.S. legislatures, the drafters on staff aren’t the core problem.
Legislative drafters have a lot of experience in part of designing law
(finding the words), but they are typically excluded from the rest. Writing
and thinking, however, are one process. And a legislature’s drafters are its
institutional memory. Some are senior in years of service to most of their
legislators. An experienced drafter has seen decades of bad law being
made and might have learned law-design lessons that legislators don’t have
much opportunity to learn.56 An hypothesis that probably won’t be tested
is that we would get better legislation if legislators were to reduce, by at
least some amount, their involvement in law design and if some staff
drafters were to have a more active role in it.

VII. Appendix A
Federal Cover-Up Crimes (from Title 18, U.S. Code)
This Appendix contains cover-up crimes involving courts and criminal
investigations, including lying to the FBI. Omitted, especially from § 1001,
are offenses like lying to Congress and administrative agencies.
This Appendix includes only the crimes’ formulations—the elements of
crimes and defenses. Omitted are provisions on penalties, jurisdiction, and
venue.
Congress drafted nearly all these sections using the formula “Whoever
[does X, Y, and Z] shall be imprisoned [number of years] or fined [details]
or both.” The same sentence that sets out the elements of the crime also
includes the penalties. That’s terrible drafting because it leads to huge
sentences, as the one in 18 U.S.C. § 1503. To cut out the distracting penalty
clutter in this Appendix, I omitted the penalty parts of the sentences and
replaced them with “shall be [penalty].” That might seem awkward
wording, but it’s a concise way to indicate a deletion needed here because
Congress uses the least effective method of creating crimes. See text after
note 30.
§ 4. Misprision of felony
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony
cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon

56 To get a sense of how legislative drafters go about their work, you can find links to about 30 state legislatures’ drafting
manuals on the National Conference of State Legislature’s website: http://www.ncsl.org/legislators-staff/legislativestaff/research-editorial-legal-and-committee-staff/bill-drafting-manuals.aspx. The Texas manual is particularly good.
See also LAWRENCE E. FILSON & SANDRA L. STROKOFF, THE LEGISLATIVE DRAFTER’S DESK REFERENCE (2d ed. 2008);
Tamara Herrera, Getting the Arizona Courts and the Arizona Legislature on the Same (Drafting) Page, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 367
(2015); Amy Langenfeld, Capitol Drafting: Legislative Drafting Manuals in the Law School Classroom, 22 PERSPS. 141 (2014).
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as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or
military authority under the United States, shall be [penalty].
§ 1001. Statements or entries generally57
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter
within the jurisdiction of the executive . . . or judicial branch of the
Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully —
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a
material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same
to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement
or entry;
shall be [penalty].
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or
that party’s counsel, for statements, representations, writings or
documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or
magistrate in that proceeding.
(c) . . .58
§ 1503. Influencing or injuring officer or juror generally59
(a) Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter
or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any
grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States,
or officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding
before any United States magistrate judge or other committing
magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or
petit juror in his person or property on account of any verdict or
indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having
been such juror, or injures any such officer, magistrate judge, or other
committing magistrate in his person or property on account of the
performance of his official duties, or corruptly or by threats or force,
or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs,

57 This is the section that Michael Flynn and George Papadopoulos pled guilty to violating. MUELLER REPORT, supra note 8,
Vol. 1, at 192–95.
58 Subsection 1001(c) applies to Congress. It is the subsection to which Michael Cohen pled guilty, together with violations
of § 1001(a)(2). Id. at 195–96. The Mueller team considered but eventually decided not to charge Jeff Sessions with violating
§ 1001(c). Id. at 197–98.
59 This is the original obstruction of justice statute, dating from 1831. See supra text accompanying notes 36–37 and notes
40–43. It is also one of the sections that the Mueller team apparently believed Donald Trump violated. See MUELLER REPORT,
supra note 8, Vol. 2, at 7–14.
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or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due
administration of justice, shall be [penalty].
§ 1504. Influencing juror by writing
Whoever attempts to influence the action or decision of any grand or
petit juror of any court of the United States upon any issue or matter
pending before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a member, or
pertaining to his duties, by writing or sending to him any written communication, in relation to such issue or matter, shall be [penalty].
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the grand jury.

(a)

(b)
(c)

(d)
(e)

§ 1510. Obstruction of criminal investigations
Whoever willfully endeavors by means of bribery to obstruct, delay,
or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation
of any criminal statute of the United States by any person to a
criminal investigator shall be [penalty].
. . .60
As used in this section, the term “criminal investigator” means any
individual duly authorized by a department, agency, or armed force
of the United States to conduct or engage in investigations of or
prosecutions for violations of the criminal laws of the United States.
. . .61
. . .62
§ 1512. Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant63

(a)
(1) Whoever kills or attempts to kill another person, with intent to —
(A) prevent the attendance or testimony of any person in an
official proceeding;
(B) prevent the production of a record, document, or other
object, in an official proceeding; or

60 Subsection 1510(b) penalizes a financial institution officer for alerting a customer that the customer’s records have been
subpoenaed. Because the crime is so narrow and specialized, I omitted it.
61 Subsection 1510(d) covers insurance company officers and employers in the same way that subsection (b) covers bank
officers. For the same reason, I omitted it.
62 Subsection 1510(e) concerns the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Right to Financial Privacy Act, and related statutes. Again,
I omitted it because it’s so narrow and specialized.
63 The Mueller team apparently believed Donald Trump violated § 1512(b) and (c)(2). See MUELLER REPORT, supra note 8,
Vol. 2, at 7–14. The dispute between Mueller and Barr centered around Congress’s sloppy use of the word otherwise in
subsection (c)(2). Compare MUELLER REPORT, supra note 8, Vol. 2, at 159–67 with the Barr audition memo, supra note 43.

140

LEGAL COMMUNICATION & RHETORIC: JALWD / VOLUME 16 / 2019

(C) prevent the communication by any person to a law
enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission
of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation,
parole, or release pending judicial proceedings;
shall be [penalty].
(2) Whoever uses physical force or the threat of physical force
against any person, or attempts to do so, with intent to —
(A) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in
an official proceeding;
(B) cause or induce any person to —
(i) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or
other object, from an official proceeding;
(ii) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent
to impair the integrity or availability of the object for
use in an official proceeding;
(iii) evade legal process summoning that person to appear as
a witness, or to produce a record, document, or other
object, in an official proceeding; or
(iv) be absent from an official proceeding to which that
person has been summoned by legal process; or
(C) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law
enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission
of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation,
supervised release, parole, or release pending judicial
proceedings;
shall be punished as provided in paragraph (3).
...
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly
persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in
misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to —
(1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an
official proceeding;
(2) cause or induce any person to —
(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or
other object, from an official proceeding;
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to
impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an
official proceeding;
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(C) evade legal process summoning that person to appear as a
witness, or to produce a record, document, or other object,
in an official proceeding; or
(D) be absent from an official proceeding to which such person
has been summoned by legal process; or
(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law
enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information
relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal
offense or a violation of conditions of probation supervised
release, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings;
shall be [penalty].
(c) Whoever corruptly —
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or
other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the
object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding;
or
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official
proceeding, or attempts to do so,
shall be [penalty].
(d) Whoever intentionally harasses another person and thereby hinders,
delays, prevents, or dissuades any person from —
(1) attending or testifying in an official proceeding;
(2) reporting to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United
States the commission or possible commission of a Federal
offense or a violation of conditions of probation, supervised
release, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings;
(3) arresting or seeking the arrest of another person in connection
with a Federal offense; or
(4) causing a criminal prosecution, or a parole or probation revocation proceeding, to be sought or instituted, or assisting in such
prosecution or proceeding;
or attempts to do so, shall be [penalty].
(e) In a prosecution for an offense under this section, it is an affirmative
defense, as to which the defendant has the burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the conduct consisted solely of
lawful conduct and that the defendant’s sole intention was to
encourage, induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully.
(f ) For the purposes of this section —
(1) an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be
instituted at the time of the offense; and
(2) the testimony, or the record, document, or other object need not
be admissible in evidence or free of a claim of privilege.
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(g) In a prosecution for an offense under this section, no state of mind
need be proved with respect to the circumstance —
(1) that the official proceeding before a judge, court, magistrate
judge, grand jury, or government agency is before a judge or
court of the United States, a United States magistrate judge, a
bankruptcy judge, a Federal grand jury, or a Federal Government
agency; or
(2) that the judge is a judge of the United States or that the law
enforcement officer is an officer or employee of the Federal
Government or a person authorized to act for or on behalf of the
Federal Government or serving the Federal Government as an
adviser or consultant.
...
§ 1513. Retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant
(a)
(1) Whoever kills or attempts to kill another person with intent to
retaliate against any person for —
(A) the attendance of a witness or party at an official
proceeding, or any testimony given or any record,
document, or other object produced by a witness in an
official proceeding; or
(B) providing to a law enforcement officer any information
relating to the commission or possible commission of a
Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation,
supervised release, parole, or release pending judicial
proceedings,
shall be [penalty].
...
(b) Whoever knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby causes
bodily injury to another person or damages the tangible property of
another person, or threatens to do so, with intent to retaliate against
any person for —
(1) the attendance of a witness or party at an official proceeding, or
any testimony given or any record, document, or other object
produced by a witness in an official proceeding; or
(2) any information relating to the commission or possible
commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of
probation, supervised release, parole, or release pending judicial
proceedings given by a person to a law enforcement officer;
or attempts to do so, shall be [penalty].
...
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§ 1515. Definitions for certain provisions; general provision
(a) As used in sections 1512 and 1513 of this title and in this section —
(1) the term “official proceeding” means —
(A) a proceeding before a judge or court of the United States, a
United States magistrate judge, a bankruptcy judge, a judge
of the United States Tax Court, a special trial judge of the
Tax Court, a judge of the United States Court of Federal
Claims, or a Federal grand jury;
(B) a proceeding before the Congress;
(C) a proceeding before a Federal Government agency which is
authorized by law; or
(D) a proceeding involving the business of insurance whose
activities affect interstate commerce before any insurance
regulatory official or agency or any agent or examiner
appointed by such official or agency to examine the affairs of
any person engaged in the business of insurance whose
activities affect interstate commerce;
(2) the term “physical force” means physical action against another,
and includes confinement;
(3) the term “misleading conduct” means —
(A) knowingly making a false statement;
(B) intentionally omitting information from a statement and
thereby causing a portion of such statement to be
misleading, or intentionally concealing a material fact, and
thereby creating a false impression by such statement;
(C) with intent to mislead, knowingly submitting or inviting
reliance on a writing or recording that is false, forged,
altered, or otherwise lacking in authenticity;
(D) with intent to mislead, knowingly submitting or inviting
reliance on a sample, specimen, map, photograph, boundary
mark, or other object that is misleading in a material
respect; or
(E) knowingly using a trick, scheme, or device with intent to
mislead;
(4) the term “law enforcement officer” means an officer or employee
of the Federal Government, or a person authorized to act for or
on behalf of the Federal Government or serving the Federal
Government as an adviser or consultant —
(A) authorized under law to engage in or supervise the
prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of an
offense; or
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(B) serving as a probation or pretrial services officer under this
title;
(5) the term “bodily injury” means —
(A) a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn, or disfigurement;
(B) physical pain;
(C) illness;
(D) impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or
mental faculty; or
(E) any other injury to the body, no matter how temporary; and
(6) the term “corruptly persuades” does not include conduct which
would be misleading conduct but for a lack of a state of mind.
(b) As used in section 1505,64 the term “corruptly” means acting with an
improper purpose, personally or by influencing another, including
making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, concealing,
altering, or destroying a document or other information.
(c) This chapter does not prohibit or punish the providing of lawful,
bona fide, legal representation services in connection with or anticipation of an official proceeding.
§ 1521. Retaliating against a Federal judge or Federal law
enforcement officer by false claim or slander of title
Whoever files, attempts to file, or conspires to file, in any public
record or in any private record which is generally available to the public,
any false lien or encumbrance against the real or personal property of an
individual described in section 1114,65 on account of the performance of
official duties by that individual, knowing or having reason to know that
such lien or encumbrance is false or contains any materially false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation, shall be [penalty].
§ 1622. Subornation of perjury
Whoever procures another to commit any perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury, and shall be [penalty].

64 18 U.S.C. § 1505, titled “Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees.”
65 18 U.S.C. § 1114: “any officer or employee of the United States . . . while such officer or employee is engaged in or on
account of the performance of official duties, or any person assisting such an officer or employee in the performance of such
duties or on account of that assistance.”
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VIII. Appendix B
Redrafted Federal Cover-Up Crimes
This Appendix is a redraft of the crimes in Appendix A. See Part 4 as
well as the footnotes in Appendix A. To avoid confusion with current law—
the numbered sections reproduced in Appendix A—sections in this redraft
are lettered (§ A, etc.). If this redraft were ever enacted—which is extremely
unlikely—the letters would naturally become numbers. Congress uses the
least effective method of creating crimes. This redraft uses a method states
often adopt when modernizing their criminal codes.66
§ A. Definitions67
In sections B through E —
(1) “Corruptly” means with an improper purpose.68
(2) “Court” means a federal court.
(3) “Endeavor” means an effort or to make an effort.69
(4) “Informant” means a person who provides information to a law
enforcement or judicial officer. A victim or witness might also be an
informant.
(5) “Injure” includes causing pain.70
(6) “Judicial officer” means a judge, magistrate, or prosecutor71 with
legal authority in a federal court.

66 See supra text after note 36.
67 Congress provided few definitions for terms used in the statutes reproduced in Appendix A. One way to reduce the
number of concepts—simplify—is to create a consistent vocabulary through definitions. Because Congress failed to do it
here, the courts have had to do it, with much effort that wouldn’t have been needed if Congress had done a complete job of
legislating. In creating some of these definitions, I used concepts from the case law.
68 In 1831, Congress used the word corruptly in what is now 18 U.S.C. § 1503, the basic obstruction of justice statute. But
Congress didn’t define it then or over the next 165 years as it added the other sections in Appendix A. During those 165
years, the courts developed four different definitions, one of which was so unacceptable that in 1996 Congress finally chose
sides and added, in § 1515(b), a definition of corruptly. For the history and the cases, see Daniel J. Hemel & Eric A. Posner,
Presidential Obstruction of Justice, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1277, 1284-89 (2018).
But the § 1515(b) definition applies only to § 1505, which penalizes obstructing justice before administrative agencies
and Congress—not courts (which is why § 1505 isn’t in Appendix A). The definition is, however, consistent with most of the
case law interpreting the sections in Appendix A.
Congress’s § 1515(b) definition is unnecessarily complicated: “acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another, including making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, concealing, altering, or destroying a
document or other information.”
Corrupt is a state of mind, and the only state of mind words in Congress’s § 1515(b) definition are “with an improper
purpose.” Everything else Congress lists is action—things a person does while in that state of mind. All the acts are already in
the statute as actus reus. Cutting out the redundant bloat leaves the phrase “improper purpose,” which also permeates the
case law. To simplify, remove ideas that don’t matter.
69 For an explanation of this definition, see supra text accompanying note 43.
70 A redraft of § 1515(a)(5), cutting out all the unnecessary concepts. The only reason to define this term is to include the
idea of pain, which might occur without what people normally think of as an injury—broken bones, bleeding, etc.
71 Prosecutors have been held to be covered even though they aren’t mentioned in § 1503’s bizarre and internally inconsistent lists of judicial officers. See United States v. Jones, 663 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1981).
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(7) “Judicial proceeding” means a proceeding in a federal court,
including a grand jury investigation.
(8) “Juror” means a petit juror, grand juror, or person who has been
summoned72 to serve as a petit or grand juror.
(9) “Law enforcement officer” means a federal officer or employee, or a
person authorized to act for the federal Government, who —
(A) is authorized under law to participate in the prevention, investigation, or prosecution of a federal offense; or
(B) serves as a probation or pretrial services officer under this title.
(10) “Proceeding” means a judicial proceeding, or an investigation by a
law enforcement officer.
§ B. Obstructing justice; corruptly influencing or impeding a judicial
officer or juror73
(a) Obstructing justice. A person is guilty of obstructing justice if that
person
(1) corruptly
(2) endeavors to influence or impede
(3) the administration of justice
(4) in a proceeding.
(b) Corruptly influencing or impeding a judicial officer or juror. A
person is guilty of corruptly influencing or impeding a judicial officer
or juror if that person
(1) corruptly
(2) endeavors to influence or impede
(3) a judicial officer or juror
(4) in the discharge of a duty.
§ C. Concealing a felony; concealing a material fact; making a false
statement.74
(a) Concealing a felony. A person is guilty of concealing a felony if —
(1) a felony under this Code has been committed, and
(2) the person endeavors to conceal the felony.

72 Even though the statutes don’t say so, the case law holds that people who have been summoned to serve as jurors are to be
treated, for obstruction of justice purposes, as jurors. See United States v. Jackson, 607 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1979). That makes
sense. A person who wants to obstruct justice could try to do so before someone is sworn in as a juror. That hadn’t occurred
to Congress. But it has occurred to the type of people Congress wanted to deter.
73 A redraft of part of § 1503, cutting out many unnecessary concepts and eliminating the need for § 1504. Subsection (a)
here is a redraft of the omnibus clause as courts have interpreted it. See supra text before and after note 42.
74 A redraft of § 4 and part of § 1001, combining the two and simplifying them. Sections C and D eliminate the need for
§ 1510(a).
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(b) Concealing a material fact. A person is guilty of concealing a
material fact if that person
(1) conceals or encourages another person to conceal
(2) a material fact
(3) from
(A) a federal law enforcement agency or
(B) a court unless the fact is concealed by a party or a party’s
counsel.
(c) Making a false statement. A person is guilty of making a false
statement if that person
(1) makes a false statement,
(2) knowing of its falsity,
(3) to
(A) a federal law enforcement agency or
(B) a court unless the statement is made by a party or a party’s
counsel.
§ D. Suborning perjury; tampering with a witness, informant, or
evidence.75
(a) Suborning perjury. A person is guilty of suborning perjury if —
(1) that person
(A) persuades a witness to testify falsely
(B) knowing that the testimony will be false; and
(2) the witness
(A) afterward testifies falsely
(B) knowing that the testimony is false.
(b) Witness tampering. A person is guilty of witness tampering if that
person —
(1) corruptly
(2) endeavors to persuade, intimidate, or mislead another person
(3) intending to
(A) influence that other person’s testimony or
(B) hinder that other person from
(i) appearing,
(ii) testifying or speaking fully and truthfully, or
(iii) producing an object76
(4) during a proceeding.

75 Subsection (a) is a redraft of § 1622. Subsection (d) includes a redraft of part of § 1001(a). The rest of this section is a
redraft of § 1512, cutting out many unnecessary concepts.
76 “Object” might seem like awkward writing, but Congress wisely used that word in the Appendix A statutes. Congress used
one concept—an “object,” meaning a tangible thing—in place of a cluster of concepts and issues such as whether something
is a document or not, whether it’s admissible as evidence, and whether the person who commits this crime believes it’s
admissible.
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(c) Informant tampering. A person is guilty of informant tampering if
that person —
(1) endeavors to persuade, intimidate, or mislead another person
(2) to hinder that other person from communicating to —
(A) a judicial officer or
(B) law enforcement officer
(3) concerning the possible
(A) commission of a federal offense or
(B) violation of conditions of
(i) probation,
(ii) supervised release,
(iii) parole, or
(iv) release pending a judicial proceeding.
(d) Evidence tampering. A person is guilty of evidence tampering if
that person does any of the following:
(1) knowingly participates in creating a false document connected
to a proceeding;
(2) knowingly participates in submitting a false document to a law
enforcement officer or a court;
(3) (A) endeavors to alter, destroy, or conceal an object
(B) intending to impair its integrity or availability in a
proceeding; or
(4) (A) endeavors to persuade, intimidate, or mislead another
person
(B) to cause that other person to withhold, alter, or destroy an
object
(C) to impair the object’s integrity or availability in a
proceeding.
(e) Facts not relevant to a prosecution under this section. It is
irrelevant whether —
(1) a proceeding was pending or about to be instituted at the time of
the offense;
(2) the object was admissible in evidence; or
(3) the defendant knew or should have known that —
(A) a proceeding was a federal proceeding;
(B) a judicial officer was a federal judicial officer; or
(C) a law enforcement officer was a federal law enforcement
officer.
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§ E. Retaliation against a judicial officer, juror, witness, party, or
informant.77
(a) Retaliating against a judicial officer. A person is guilty of retaliating against a judicial officer if that person —
(1) endeavors or threatens to —
(A) injure or kill a judicial official;
(B) damage a judicial officer’s property; or
(C) file a false document as a publicly available record
concerning the judicial officer’s ownership of property;78
(2) to retaliate for the judicial officer’s performance of an official
duty.
(b) Retaliating against a juror. A person is guilty of retaliating against a
juror if that person —
(1) endeavors or threatens to —
(A) injure or kill a juror;
(B) damage a juror’s property; or
(C) file a false document as a publicly available record
concerning the juror’s ownership of property;79
(2) to retaliate for
(A) a verdict or indictment assented to by the juror or
(B) the juror’s service as a juror.
(c) Retaliating against a witness or party. A person is guilty of retaliation against a witness or party if that person —
(1) endeavors or threatens to —
(A) injure or kill another person;
(B) damage another person’s property; or
(C) file a false document as a publicly available record
concerning the other person’s ownership of property;
(2) to retaliate for that other person’s doing any of the following
during a proceeding:
(A) attending or participating as a witness or party,
(B) testifying,
(C) providing information, or
(D) producing an object.

77 Subsections (a) and (b) are a redraft of part of § 1503. Subsections (c) and (d) are a redraft of § 1513. In redrafting, many
unnecessary concepts disappeared. But it isn’t possible to combine all the § E subsections into one test that would cover
everybody. Although paragraph (1) is parallel in all the subsections, no paragraph (2) is the same as any other paragraph (2).
78 Adding the 16 words in (C) replaces all of § 1521, which Congress enacted because of some incidents in which people
harassed judges with false filings. But Congress didn’t need to enact § 1521. All it needed to do was add these words to § 1503.
79 When Congress enacted § 1521, it responded to incidents involving judges. It didn’t occur to Congress to protect jurors,
parties, witnesses, and informants. This redraft covers them.
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(d) Retaliating against an informant. A person is guilty of retaliation
against an informant if that person —
(1) endeavors or threatens to —
(A) injure or kill another person;
(B) damage another person’s tangible property; or
(C) file a false document as a publicly available record
concerning the informant’s ownership of property;
(2) to retaliate for that other person’s providing to a law
enforcement officer or judicial officer information relating to the
possible
(A) commission of a federal offense or
(B) violation of conditions of
(i) probation,
(ii) supervised release,
(iii) parole, or
(iv) release pending a judicial proceeding.

